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Book Notes 241 
of love is a traditional topic in Roman Catholic moral theology; it designates 
the attempt to determine, iIi the context of Christ's command to love our 
neighbor, who has greater or lesser claims to our love. Pope criticizes contem-
porary Catholic theologians for neglecting this topic: personalist theologians 
of love (e.g., Robert Johann) restrict their analyses to close interpersonal 
relationships, while liberation theologians (e.g., Gustavo Gutierrez) view love 
mainly as solidarity with the poor and oppressed. Accepting Aquinas's dictum 
that grace perfects human nature and following his example of turning to 
contemporary (for him, Aristotelian) biology to better understand human na-
ture before formulating a doctrine of the order of love (Summa Theologiae 
2.2.26), Pope argues that "the accounts of human altruism developed by 
behavioral biology can be used to correct the deficiencies of recent Catholic 
interpretations of love" (p. 7). 
Pope gives a balanced and well-documented treatment of his topic, rightly 
pointing out that moral theologians must take seriously our evolutionary heri-
tage. The book would benefit, however, from the addition of an index. 
D. C. A. 
Janaway, Christopher. Schopenhauer. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. Pp. 113. $7.95 (paper). 
Though not as analytical as D. W. Hamlyn's study, or as entertaining as 
Rudiger Safranski's recent book, Janaway's text fulfills the mission of Oxford's 
Past Masters series by presenting Schopenhauer concisely and accessibly. Scho-
penhauer's metaphysical system is traversed briskly, with accounts of his ideal-
ism and identification of agency-as-noumenon with a romantic elan vital per-
meating nature. Janaway is impatient with Schopenhauer's metaphysics, and 
rightly so: Schopenhauer ignored what was most interesting in Kant (the 
argument of the first Critique beyond the Aesthetic and his ethics) and fastened 
on what has proven to be most sterile: transcendental idealism. Schopenhauer 
applied his metaphysics to a wide range of lively topics (e.g., sexuality, death, 
compassion, transcendence through art). Clearly Janaway wishes us to regard 
Schopenhauer as an important thinker in his own right, but this claim is 
doubtful. His contribution to philosophy is a vision of action and cognition 
as deeply embedded in a naturalistic and pragmatic context. This achievement 
is even more remarkable for occurring before Darwin. He is the first philoso-
pher to seriously grapple with the irrational. But in the end his value lay more 
in the model and impetus he gave to Nietzsche, Freud, and Wittgenstein. 
R. K. H. 
Babich, Babette E. Nietzsche's Philosophy of Science: Reflecting Science on the 
Ground of Art and Life. 
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994. Pp. 350. $16.95 (cloth). 
Analytic philosophy of science largely regards scientific knowledge as a fait 
accompli. According to Babich, however, Nietzsche has shown that science's 
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epistemological credentials are inadequate. Attention to the "ecophysiological" 
roots of science-our situatedness in an environment with limited cognitive 
resources-reveals science's cognitive shortcomings. We should overcome the 
illusion of epistemic success (truth) in favor of consciously created illusions, 
to be judged by aesthetic criteria. 
Babich leans on material criticizing science and praising art in The Birth 
of Tragedy and "On Truth and Lie in an Extramoral Sense," largely ignoring 
some later material reversing this evaluation. Also, such a critique of science 
would depend upon the correctness of the "ecophysiological" account itself: 
truth has returned through the back door, and with it, the question of how 
we acquired it. 
Her final three chapters focus on Nietzsche's axiological critique of science 
and are far more successful. In particular, "Nietzsche's Genealogy of Science," 
which discusses the will to truth and asceticism, will reward careful reading 
and discussion. 
Babich correctly identifies the naturalistic commitments (or "hyperreal-
ism," as she puts it) in Nietzsche's epistemology. How his skepticism can be 
reconciled with such commitments remains unexplained. R. K. H. 
Mulhall, Stephen. Stanley Cavell: Philosophy'S Recounting of the Ordinary. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. Pp. 343. $52.00 (doth). 
This book contains what is likely to remain for some time the most comprehen-
sive and most ramified account of Cavell's work. It is a tour de finesse, at once 
densely argued and lucidly written, destined to become required reading in 
these fields. Mulhall aims at providing a kind of intellectual itinerary wherein 
Cavell's positions emerge against his central and persisting concern with skep-
ticism and also against the widening regions of his other explorations. He 
provides a series of virtuoso renditions of the different pathways taken by 
Cavell's encounters with skepticism. His account will make it harder to quaran-
tine certain aspects of Cavell's treatment of the skeptic as merely literary or 
merely psychological-as opposed to the "strictly philosophical." Mulhall thus 
puts us in a better position to understand Cavell's readings of figures (from 
Shakespeare to Freud and Emerson) that most philosophers still treat as for-
eign to philosophy and as disparate from one another. Among the rare pas-
sages where Mulhall's interpretive tact seems to flag are an uncharacteristically 
one-sided account of Cavell's "hostility to Christianity" (p. 292) and an overly 
schematic assimilation of Cavell's engagements with psychoanalysis to Mul-
hall's interpretation of "redemptive reading" (pp. 216-21). T. D. G. 
